Critical minerals have moved to the centre of industrial and foreign policy. This report examines
who controls processing capacity, why that concentration is difficult to reverse, and how competition
over supply chains could develop across four distinct futures.
Three countries account for more than 90% of global lithium production. China refines 19 of
the 20 minerals most critical to clean energy technologies. That concentration reflects the
economics of processing as much as deliberate policy: the chemical and physical requirements of
refining, combined with the difficulty and cost of establishing new capacity elsewhere, have
narrowed each supply chain to a small number of viable actors. New processing projects outside
China are on average 50% more expensive to build and routinely struggle to secure long-term
offtake agreements.
This report examines how that situation came about, what makes it durable, and what it means
for organisations with exposure to mineral supply chains. It sets out four scenarios for how the
competition over processing capacity could develop through the 2030s, and identifies the
specific indicators that would distinguish one trajectory from another.
WHAT THIS REPORT COVERS
The economics and industrial logic behind mineral processing concentration, and why
reversing it takes longer than building new extraction capacity.
Four anchor minerals — rare earths, cobalt, lithium, nickel — examined individually for
processing dependency, viable alternatives, and structural shortfall.
Four distinct scenarios, each with different implications for Western industrial policy,
producer-state leverage, and supply chain strategy.
The strategic implications of each scenario for corporations, financial institutions, and
government bodies with exposure to critical mineral supply chains.
Indicators to watch as each scenario develops, so readers can track the analysis against
events as they unfold.
